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ABSTRACT 
Many of the participants in the analytical debate on the relation between 
belief and will have closely considered S0ren Kierkegaard's volitionalist account of the 
issue. I argue that the attempt to understand the nature of volitionalism requires a closer 
investigation of Kierkegaard's perspective on the nature of faith. 
In Chapter One, I offer the conceptual framework in which I will discuss the 
problem of volitionalism, distinguishing between the epistemic and the foundational role 
of belief. I show that the will has an important role to play in relation to our beliefs, 
especially when we lack epistemic justification. 
In Chapter Two, I investigate the main features and issues in volitionalism. I 
address the distinctions between direct vs. indirect volitionalism, and descriptive vs. 
prescriptive volitionalism, in order to integrate correctly Kierkegaard's account into the 
contemporary debate on the nature of volitionalism. 
In Chapter Three, I argue in support of my thesis that Kierkegaard's 
volitionalism is a special sort of direct volitionalism, which is concerned with the role of 
the will, not in relation to the acquisition of belief, but rather to its actualization. The 
conclusion reached in this thesis is that Kierkegaard claims that the will enables us to 
move, through choice, from a set of belief possibilities characterized by "objective 
uncertainty" to the subjective actuality of belief and existential commitments. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Volitionalism is essentially the theory that confers a determinative role on 
the will in relation to belief. This theory can be formulated in various ways. Volitionalism 
can be characterized as direct (strong sense) or indirect (weak sense) with respect to the 
emphasis it puts on the role of the will in belief. And it can be either descriptive or 
prescriptive, maintaining that the will either simply influences or actually demands 
certain beliefs. Many of the participants in the analytical debate on belief and will have 
closely considered S0ren Kierkegaard' s account of the issue of the nature of belief and 
faith. There has been a great deal of debate for instance on the question of whether 
Kierkegaard is an exponent of direct or indirect volitionalism. The controversy has 
involved many contemporary philosophers, such as L. P. Pojman, C. S. Evans, G. 
Schufreider, R. Holyer, and M. J. Ferreira, to name only a few, whose views are often 
diametrically opposed. 
I argue that central to this attempt to understand the nature of volitionalism 
and to spell out Kierkegaard's standpoint is the problem of the correct interpretation of 
Kierkegaard' s response to the case of skeptical "objective uncertainty," i.e., the 
impossibility of reaching the objective truth. Further considerations regarding the relation 
between belief and faith necessitate a closer investigation of Kierkegaard's perspective on 
the nature of faith in relation to what he calls "the absolute paradox" of Christian belief, 
1 
which, in this context, is nothing but an insuperable objective uncertainty. 
Before addressing these questions more closely, I first give a brief sketch of 
the conceptual framework that circumscribes the on-going debate on the nature of belief 
and its relation to knowledge. Thus in the first chapter of this thesis I describe belief 
within the confines offered by the traditional definition of knowledge as justified, true 
belief. Since it would be very difficult to accommodate here a thorough discussion of the 
problem of truth-conditions, I mainly focus on the condition of justification and argue that 
it is a very important feature in the context of the way knowledge claims are developed. 
The main problem to be addressed is the problem of justification where evidential support 
is lacking. In this context, the considerations regarding the situation where we have only 
inconclusive evidence arguably allow for my claim, in agreement with Kierkegaard's, 
that belief occurs when doubt rules out any possibility of knowledge qua "objective 
certainty" and requires subjective voluntary involvement. One decides to believe quia 
absurdum. 
An investigation on the nature of belief will also have to consider the 
questions and distinctions discussed by H. H. Price in his classical account of the concept 
of belief. These include the question whether belief should be regarded as an occurrence 
or a disposition, so that the place of the will in the relation to the issue of the formation of 
beliefs is determined accordingly. If the will plays no role in the generative process then it 
may be the case that this has some consequence in relation to the way beliefs are 
determinative for actions, especially when we are confronted with little or no available 
evidential justification. The fundamental question then is: does the agent deliberately 
2 
choose to believe the grounds of his or her subsequent actions? 
My aim in this thesis is to analyze and defend Kierkegaard's perspective on 
the issue of volitionalism. I show that, for Kierkegaard, the will has an important role to 
play in relation to our beliefs, especially when we lack evidential justification. 
Kierkegaard identifies voluntary choice as a means to move from a set of belief 
possibilities characterized by "objective uncertainty" to an appropriate actuality that fits 
our subjective purposes. The relevance of Kierkegaard's account of the nature of faith is 
that, although faith is a gift from God, it still requires a choice and subjective 
commitment. I submit that in the light of Kierkegaard's account of modal categories, 
choice is necessary for the actualization of what was initially offered only as a possibility. 
This supports the conclusion I reach in this thesis, namely that Kierkegaard holds a 
particular sort of direct volitionalism which is concerned with the role of the will in 
relation to the actualization (not acquisition) of beliefs, as they shape and define our 
individuality and our existential standpoint. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Conceptual Framework 
Introductory Note 
My aim in this chapter is to reopen and investigate one path that has not 
been extensively explored in the last two decades, namely, the role played by the will in 
relation to the justification of one's beliefs. I will try to identify the cognate controversies 
and integrate the arguments into contemporary debate on the nature of knowledge and the 
dispute over the way religious beliefs are formed. 
The traditional epistemological endeavor developed distinctions of great 
value, like the differentiation between mere belief (d6xa) and genuine knowledge 
(episteme), and the "correspondence theory of truth." It eventually formulated the 
"tripartite analysis of knowledge," which is the most influential and broadly accepted 
epistemological theory today, and which states that "propositional knowledge is, by 
definition, justified true belief [my emphases]." 1 I will take this formula for granted, 
aware of contemporary objections and adjustments, and try to determine the place belief 
has in this equation. 
My contention is that one can easily distinguish between an epistemic and a 
1 P. K. Moser, D. H. Mulder, J.D. Trout- The Theory of Knowledge. A Thematic Introduction, New York; 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 14. 
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foundational aspect of belief. The former is concerned with our knowledge claims, 
whereas the latter determines our actions. The question is whether our will has an 
important role to play in relation to our beliefs. 
After discussing some of the necessary distinctions about the nature of 
knowledge and belief, and ascribing an important role to justification, I will undertake an 
introductory analysis of the relation between knowledge, belief and doubt. It is also 
necessary to sketch an introduction to the different perspectives on the nature of belief, 
and to discuss the difference between "propositional belief' ("belief that") and 
"evaluative belief' ("belief in"), as well as the role of evidence vs. the role of trust. My 
main concern will be to investigate the role of will in belief and, if there is such a role, 
determine whether it is a direct or an indirect one. 
Defining Knowledge: Belief, Truth, and Justification 
In the tripartite theory of knowledge, truth and justification are conditions 
that any belief needs to satisfy in order to qualify as genuine knowledge. These two 
predicates are themselves subject to various interpretations, although one thing seems to 
be beyond any doubt: knowledge requires belief, as its logically necessary condition. It is 
a common fact that "philosophers have rarely disagreed about whether belief is required 
for knowledge, but they have often disagreed about the nature of belief itself."2 
2 P. K. Moser, D. H. Mulder, J. D. Trout- The Theory of Knowledge, p. 16. 
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Yet belief qua belief is a necessary but not a sufficient condition of 
knowledge. There must be something else added to belief in order for it to be knowledge. 
Traditionally, the other necessary ingredients are, as already mentioned, "truth" and 
"justification," although more recent studies show that they are nonetheless far from 
being sufficient. The nature of truth is continuously disputed between philosophers from 
various traditions, and too broad a topic to be investigated here. I will assume that truth 
alone is not a sufficient condition for a belief to be considered knowledge. A lucky guess 
will never have epistemic value. My conjecture that "Today is Monday," for instance, 
will never have a strong epistemic value despite any fortunate coincidence unless I have a 
strong justification for that. 
It is necessary that our belief also satisfy the condition of being adequately 
related to the truth claim in question by means of strong evidence available to others or by 
some other form of justification. H. H. Price holds that "we should all agree that a person 
can only believe reasonably when he has evidence for the proposition believed," and that 
"it would be unreasonable to believe a proposition with complete conviction if our 
evidence [ ... ] falls short of being conclusive."3 It is, therefore, the latter of the two 
predicates of belief, i.e., justification that I intend to address in particular detail. I shall try 
to establish what sort of justification one can have in order to support one's epistemic 
claims. 
It should be emphasized however that even justification based on strong 
evidence could deceive. Contemporary epistemologists endorse the idea of fallibilism, 
3 H. H. Price -Belief, London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1969, p. 92. 
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acknowledging that "a proposition can enjoy overwhelming evidence or justification but 
still be false."4 Thus justification is subject to change in the light of additional evidence 
that is offered. But this is not a problem provided that no absolute epistemic claims based 
on the currently available evidence are made. 
The Nature of Belief 
As regards the epistemic role of belief, I have already indicated that 
understanding belief is a sine qua non for understanding knowledge and formulating an 
epistemology. Perhaps one of the most important areas in the investigation of the nature 
of "belief' is the relation it establishes with "meaning." This is considered to be an 
"intentional" feature, for every belief is about something, and, as a consequence, "beliefs 
are representational, functioning as maps by which we portray and navigate the world."5 
The fact that beliefs are representational is one of the most significant 
aspects of the nature of belief, and it amounts to the idea that they constitute the 
framework of how we represent the world to ourselves. Individual beliefs are responsible 
for the various interpretations that can be encountered from one individual to another. The 
way one represents the world may be dramatically different from the way another one 
represents it, and this fact alone appears to authorize epistemic relativism. 
Contemporary theories maintain that beliefs belong to the category of 
4 P. K. Moser, D. H. Mulder, J.D. Trout- The Theory of Knowledge, p. 78. 
5 Cf. P. K. Moser, D. H. Mulder, J.D. Trout- The Theory of Knowledge, p. 42. 
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psychological states that are characterized by an attitude or disposition towards a certain 
propositional content. As a consequence, beliefs are also called "propositional attitudes."6 
Being thus a psychological feature, belief certainly allows differentiations. Different 
individuals but also the same individual can have different attitudes toward the same 
proposition concomitantly. 
Traditional vs. modern analysis of belief 
According to Price, there are two different ways of analyzing belief. There 
is, on the one side, the way belief is traditionally treated (e.g., Hume), and, on the other, 
the way contemporary thinkers approach the issue (e.g., Price). The former, I would say, 
is basically concerned with belief under its definitional aspect. Thus what I find in the 
traditional treatment of belief is either the search for the very condition of the possibility 
of there being any belief whatsoever, or, at least, once the genus proximus is broadly 
recognized, according to Price, as "introspectible mental occurrence,"7 there is the 
attempt to identify the differentia specifica peculiar to belief, i.e., the specific aspects that 
particularize it amongst other such "mental occurrences." 
The alternative way of analyzing belief understands belief not as a mental 
occurrence but rather as a "disposition." Price thinks that this is the contemporary 
counterpoint of the traditional analysis, but, in fact, it is no more than a discussion related 
to the nature of belief under its functional aspect. In other words, it seems that the modern 
perspective abandons the attempt to offer a definition of belief and focuses on the effects 
6 Cf. P. K. Moser, D. H. Mulder, J.D. Trout- The Theory of Knowledge, p. 42. 
7 H. H. Price - Belief, p. 20. 
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of belief and the way they affect human actions. 
The fact that one believes that there might be a storm tomorrow would 
indeed affect one's plans of going fishing, for instance. But it would not help clarify the 
haecceitas of that very belief. In the search for a principium individuationis, a search for 
that which uniquely distinguishes each individual thing from others in the same genus, 
my claim is that it is not of primary importance whether a particular belief is an 
indifferent one, in the sense that it has no effect on one's plans of action, or if it 
immediately determines certain actions. The question is: what is a belief in either case? 
Consequently, as regards Price's main distinction, my claim is that the traditional way of 
analyzing belief is more fruitful and appropriate, but that the functional aspect of belief 
should be acknowledged as a very important factor in determining the way belief enters in 
relation to human actions. Price adopts the modern view and contends that belief is an 
"attitude" oriented towards action. It is precisely under this aspect that I will argue that 
belief is a matter of will. 
Hume' s analysis 
Price claims that Hume is "the most celebrated exponent" of the traditional 
Occurrence Analysis of belief, which describes belief as a mental event that influences 
our attitude towards a certain proposition. In the Treatise of Human Nature, Hume refers 
"most of the time [to] the sorts of belief which are relevant to his problem about the Idea 
of Necessary Connection, [ ... ] the sort of belief which we have when we take a perceived 
event or situation as a sign of another event or situation which is not at the moment 
9 
perceived. "8 
In his analysis, Hume basically distinguishes between two different attitudes 
that one may have towards a proposition: belief and incredulity (the latter including both 
disbelief and indifference). The question is what differentiates them. Firstly, Hume 
indicates that it is not ideas about the content of a particular proposition (e.g., whether it 
is indeed going to rain or not in the "believed" proposition "It is going to rain tomorrow") 
that produce the difference. For, as he accurately remarks, a particular attitude towards a 
given proposition may vary at different times and different individuals. Hume claims that 
"believing does not consist in adding some extra idea to those which were before our 
minds already."9 It is rather a difference that lies in the "manner of conceiving." The way 
in which an individual "conceives" a certain content of a proposition does not rely on the 
ideas that she has before her mind (i.e., the conceived content): 
For when I believe that there is a dog outside the door [when I 
hear a barking sound] but you are incredulous about it, there is no difference 
between the 'ideas' we conceive of. To put it otherwise, what you are 
thinking of is the same as what I am thinking of. The difference is that you 
think of it in an incredulous manner and I in a believing manner. Similarly, if 
I come to believe something which I previously disbelieved or doubted, the 
change which occurs in me is just a change in my manner of conceiving- not 
in what I conceive of. 10 
The difference made in the manner of conceiving, as Price puts Hume's position, amounts 
to maintaining that "an idea which we believe is conceived in a lively or vivacious 
manner, or presents itself to our minds in a lively or vivacious way; whereas an idea 
which is not believed does not present itself to our minds in this lively way, but in a faint 
8 H. H. Price- Belief, pp. 157-158. 
9 H. H. Price- Belief, p. 162. 
10 H. H. Price - Belief, p. 164. 
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or feeble way." 11 
According to Price, the reason why Hume does not admit that new ideas may 
be added to those considered in the first instance and that they may change our attitude 
towards a proposition is that "it would [then] be in our power to believe whatever we 
pleased."12 What Hume holds to be true about the nature of belief in genere is that belief 
is "something which arises in us independently of our choice." 13 As Price notices, Hume 
considers this an obvious idea and offers no examples. Therefore, Price tries to help and 
provides a couple. For instance, he says that "when you look through the window and see 
rain falling heavily, you cannot help believing that the streets outside are wet." 
Nevertheless, it may well be the case that this is not true in all possible worlds, for I could 
easily imagine a situation in which urban development solutions were applied in order to 
prevent that from happening. Further, considering the illusory content of my perceptions, 
I cannot rely on the proof of my senses either. Consequently, Price's examples fail to 
offer conclusive grounds for claiming that belief is not an object for choice, and is thus 
involuntary. 
"Belief-that" and "Belief-in" 
Price distinguishes "belief-that" from "belief-in." As he puts it, "what we 
11 H. H. Price - Belief, p. 165. 
12 H. H. Price- Belief, p. 161. 
13 H. H. Price- Belief, p. 161. 
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mean by belief in someone or something and how believing 'in' is related to believing 
'that' " 14 are essential questions when approaching the issue of faith, for instance. Based 
on Price's distinction regarding the English use of the term "evidence," 15 it could be 
easily noticed how "belief that" is scarcely ever understood as having "self-evident" 
grounds. It follows that propositional belief is always founded on "evidence." If and only 
if sufficient evidence for the truth of a particular proposition is available could one make 
an epistemic claim. 
Summarizing Price's distinctions, Louis. P. Pojman points out that "believe-
in" statements go beyond "believe-that" statements. Belief-that statements are 
ontological. Belief-in statements are evaluative in that they add "an extra feature, that of 
value or importance." 16 In his paper, Pojman prefers to discuss only 'belief-that' 
utterances, since many 'believe-in' statements are reducible, he says, to 'believe-that' 
statements. When a 'believe-in' statement is the expression for faith as trust, it generally 
presupposes a 'believe-that' statement, although it usually says something more than that. 
However, this extra feature is the most intriguing one. 
'Believing-in' sometimes occurs without the support of 'believing-that.' 
Certainly, from the radical claim that de omnibus dubitandum est, and from the 
assumption that belief is opposed to doubt (as is also the case in Kierkegaard), the 
conclusion that belief is never possible could be easily drawn. But we do have beliefs, all 
14 H. H. Price- Belief, p. 23. 
15 Later in this paper, I will address Price's distinction and discuss its relevance to the analysis of the nature 
of belief. 
16 Louis P. Pojman- "Belief and Will", in Religious Studies, vol. 14, no. I, March, Cambridge University 
Press, 1978, p. 4. 
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the same, and this is a good reason to re-examine the status of "believing in," even if from 
a skeptical perspective uttering knowledge claims in the form of "believe-that" statements 
is not possible. 
"Believing in"- from doubt to subjective certainty 
Beliefs should be differentiated together with the distinct objects that they 
refer to. On the one hand, beliefs about the existence of God, for instance, may vary 
radically. On the other hand, it is largely acceptable that the truth of other beliefs such as 
"1 + 1 =2" is not a matter of dispute. But, as everything is to be doubted, it is not totally 
inconceivable, at least in other possible worlds, that even mathematical truths are not 
serious candidates for the status of objective truths. 
In the end, any form of propositional belief, i.e., of "belief-that" arguably 
relies on one form or another of "belief-in," that is, on trust. Not even the principle of 
identity offers absolute certainty, for even logical principles like the principle of identity 
("A = A") must satisfy a strong requirement, i.e., that "A" be considered at the same time 
and from the same point of view. The issue of identity proves itself to be even more 
complicated if investigated in the area of selfhood. As a consequence, a critical analysis is 
required, filtered through our dubitative mechanism, before any logical truth with 
absolute value be accepted. 
On the one hand, as I will show, Kierkegaard clearly distinguishes belief 
from doubt: "belief is the opposite of doubt." 17 They are both "passions," in 
17 S¢ren Kierkegaard -Philosophical Fragments, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985, p. 84. 
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Kierkegaard's terms, but, whereas doubt suspends choice and action, belief facilitates 
them. On the other hand, from Kierkegaard's perspective, what separates belief from 
cognition in relation to doubt, the main reason why the former is distinct from the latter, 
is that belief and cognition look for and reach different ends. Cognition seeks to eliminate 
doubt and reach to a conclusion (Slutning), whereas the conclusiveness of belief is a 
resolution (Beslutning) that resolves doubt and encourages choice. 
Many of our beliefs are, first and foremost, based on a greater or smaller 
amount of trust. In order to avoid a regressus ad infinitum (trying to find the ultimate 
"evidence for" the truth of a particular proposition), we are often compelled to accept 
various truth-claims without further justification. For instance, it is only in relation to my 
choosing to trust and believe in my senses that any sensory evidence can be accepted and 
ground my beliefs derived from the world of senses. 
Price points to the fact that modern English has almost lost the etymological 
sense associated with e-vide(nce), which is present only in the term "self-evident." He 
contends that "a self evident proposition is one which is 'evident of itself' ." 18 This 
requires a necessary distinction between "evidence of' a proposition and "evidence for" 
it. The latter consists of "those considerations which support that proposition or confer 
some degree of probability upon it, great or little." 19 
One can have varying degrees of confidence about the truth of some 
proposition. But one's confidence is a subjective psychological state. That definitely 
indicates at least the fact that particular beliefs have varying degrees of probability. The 
18 H. H. Price - Belief, p. 92. 
19 H. H. Price- Belief, p. 92. 
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degree of probability of a belief can either be strengthened or weakened, as in the case of 
inductive arguments, by means of additional information acquired during the process of 
justification. 
In many cases of "belief-that," besides taking into account the available 
evidence, I also rely on a form of trust. That is to say, in many cases "belief-that" 
necessitates "belief-in" and together they shape our beliefs. Evidence could indeed be 
necessary for the occurrence of belief, but is not a sufficient condition. It is under the 
agent's control to offer or withhold assent, by means of voluntarily choosing to do so. To 
illustrate this situation when evidence is not conclusive let us suppose, for instance, that 
only a few scientists have direct access to complete evidence of there once being water on 
Mars. They might end up eventually formulating a scientific theory accordingly. Now, I 
don't have that evidence. Besides, some other theory denies that the evidence provided by 
the Martian soil samples is completely determinative and conclusive. What Evans rightly 
points out is that "it is perfectly conceivable that I might decide to believe [that there was 
water on Mars, in my example], even though the evidence to me is less than conclusive or 
even points the other way [my italics]."20 
Price points to another characteristic feature of one's belief-in. According to 
Price, evaluative belief-in is "always an interested attitude, never a disinterested one."21 
Kierkegaard too talked about the necessity of a form of "interest" (Interesse), as 
involvement in one's existence. According to Schellenberg, Kierkegaard considers that 
20 C. Stephen Evans - "Book Review: Louis P. Pojman's Religious Belief and The Will", in International 
Journal for Philosophy of Religion, vol. 28, no. 1, August, K1uwer Academic Publishers, 1990, p. 50. 
21 H. H. Price- Belief, p. 161. 
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interest is "necessary for the apprehension of ethical and religious truths." God uses the 
method of indirect communication, in order to, on the one hand, "stimulate the proper sort 
of subjective involvement in our existence as human beings, and, on the other hand, in 
order to prevent situations and states incompatible with such involvement."22 As 
Schellenberg puts it, "the subjective individual [in Kierkegaard] focuses his interests on 
some idea and, through his own decisions, brings his life into conformity with it."23 In 
other words, the individual appropriates and integrates the idea in his life, through choice. 
If objective certainty is not to be attained, then it is the subjective one that needs to be 
looked for. But this certainty is a certainty of the will. 
This thesis argues that will is an essential feature of belief, especially in the 
case of the lack of direct evidence, when one is forced to choose to act relying largely on 
trust, i.e., confidence in one's own discernment or in the evidence advanced by others. 
Take, for instance, the existence of God, life after death, extraterrestrial intelligence, the 
existence of other ideas, or even the existence of "ideas," in genere. Various types of 
arguments have been offered, but, eventually, as I will try to show, it takes the believer a 
"leap of faith" to believe in the existence of such entities. This certainly relativizes our 
beliefs, demanding careful consideration and preventing us from absolutizations of 
knowledge. 
22 J. L. Schellenberg - Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press, 
1993, p. 153. 
23 J. L. Schellenberg- Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, p. 154. 
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An Introduction to Kierkegaard's View 
As regards the role of the will in relation to belief, Schellenberg claims that 
"Kierkegaard' s understanding of faith seems clearly to presuppose that belief is 
voluntary: we are told that to have intense inwardness, we must choose to believe 
propositions viewed as improbable."24 Schellenberg does not accept this volitionalist 
presupposition. For him, belief is logically involuntary. Schellenberg argues 
that this is so in the sense that "we cannot believe a proposition at a moment's notice. "25 
Additionally he says that "we would know that our 'beliefs' were the result of our 
decisions and not determined by how things are." But, in Price's terms, Schellenberg's 
use of "belief' falls, precisely, under the sense of "belief-that" or, at best, under the one of 
"factual belief-in," which ultimately is reducible to the belief-that. 
The keynote of Kierkegaard's understanding of the nature of belief resides in 
the contention that "belief is not a knowledge but an act of freedom, an expression of 
wi11."26 Under this voluntary aspect, "belief resolves to believe [even when] it runs the 
risk that [what it believed] it was an error.'m But this is far from being broadly accepted. 
In Hume's perspective on the nature of belief, as shown before, belief is regarded as 
"something which arises in us independently of our choice."28 
24 J. L. Schellenberg- Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, pp. 163-164. 
25 J. L. Schellenberg- Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, p. 9. 
26 S. Kierkegaard -Philosophical Fragments, p. 83. 
27 S. Kierkegaard- Philosophical Fragments, note 53, p. 83. 
28 Cf. H. H. Price - Belief, p. 161. 
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Conclusion 
I have pointed out thus far that belief can be primarily described within the 
confines of the traditional definition of knowledge. The problem of the justification-
condition becomes more difficult in the context of the lack of evidential support when 
skepticism calls for belief suspension. I also tried to determine the relevance of Price's 
distinction of "believe-that" and "believe-in" statements in relation to the condition of 
justification. In addition, I submitted that belief has a determinative role for actions, for 
on the basis of it one deliberately chooses on what to ground subsequent actions. 
Kierkegaard's anticipated response is that doubt not only rules out the possibility of 
uttering any knowledge claim, but it does incite voluntary involvement. This implies that 
the will determines the pursuit of actions grounded on subjective beliefs. 
I have already indicated in the introduction that a theory that confers a 
determinative role on the will in relation to belief is called "volitionalism." There is a 
great deal of controversy here, in part generated by the various ways in which 
Kierkegaard's volitionalist claims are interpreted. It will now be useful to ponder the 
dispute over the characteristics of volitionalism and try to determine the value of the 
important distinctions made in contemporary debates (e.g., direct vs. indirect 
volitionalism), in order to integrate correctly Kierkegaard's account into the overall 
picture of volitionalism. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
A Critical Account of the Problems in Volitionalism 
Introductory Note 
As a philosophical theory, volitionalism can be broadly defined as a thesis 
which claims that our will has a determinative role (either direct or indirect) in relation to 
our beliefs. The contemporary debate surveys more specific issues like the distinction 
between "descriptive" (which only reports the role of the will in belief) and "prescriptive" 
volitionalism (which demands that we voluntarily believe that something is the case). 
This distinction needs discussion, since on the basis of it volitionalism can be validated or 
criticized as "morally wrong." For instance, some of the participants in the analytical 
debate on belief and will describe S0ren Kierkegaard's volitionalism and his account on 
the nature of faith as prescriptive and thus as an unacceptable form of volitionalism. Also, 
distinguishing between strong and weak volitionalism, some have argued that 
Kierkegaard holds a weak volitionalism. There has been an inconclusive dispute over 
these issues. A closer examination is required. 
I will first sketch the conceptual framework of the above-mentioned 
distinctions and disputes. I will try to support the claim that in some cases a deliberate 
choice to believe a certain proposition is necessary in order to proceed to action. I point to 
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cases where only irrelev~nt evidence, or none at all, is available and when relying on trust 
becomes the sole justification. Thus the evaluative component of belief ("believing-in") 
becomes the only reliable practical guide. 
There are several problems regarding the role of the will in relation to belief 
that need discussion. In the late eighties, a new philosophical debate developed around 
the issue of the relation between will and belief. For instance, Robert Holyer indicates 
two opposite views in the philosophy of mind, as regards the constitutive role of will in 
belief. He specifies that "most of the classical accounts of religious belief [ ... ] have 
accorded the will an important, if not decisive, role."29 According to Holyer, the 
discussion of belief and will addressed "the question whether we can believe at will apart 
from any sort of evidence- what has been called belief by fiat [my italics]."30 
As one of his opponents puts it, Holyer's contention is that "the debate 
carried on by Price, Williams, Classen, [Pojman] and others has focused too exclusively 
on whether we can obtain beliefs directly by the will, by fiat, as it were, without 
appreciating that there are other ways in which the will may directly influence belief 
acquisition."31 Thus the focus of the debate has been unfruitfully narrowed to the issue of 
the formation of beliefs by fiat. 
29 Robert Holyer - "Belief and Will Revisited", in Dialogue. Canadian Philosophical Review I Revue 
canadienne de philosophie, vol. XXII, no. 2, June 1983, p. 273. 
30 R. Holyer- "Belief and Will Revisited", p. 273. 
31 Louis P. Pojman- "A Critique of Holyer's Volitionalism", in Dialogue. Canadian Philosophical Review I 
Revue canadienne de philosophie, vol. XXIII, no. 4, December 1984, p. 695. 
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Volitionalism: Distinctions 
In Religious Belief and the Will, Pojman attempts a thorough examination of 
volitionalism32, i.e., the standpoint that considers our beliefs to be under the direct or the 
indirect control of our will, which is also called 'descriptive volitionalism.' As C. Stephen 
Evans briefly renders it, "direct volitionalism treats the action by which a belief is formed 
as a basic action which can simply be willed, [whereas] indirect volitionalism regards the 
formation of a belief as an outcome of doing other actions."33 
In an earlier paper, Pojman describes two versions of volitionalism: direct 
and indirect. Yet he introduces a couple of supplementary notes which generate 
controversy and complicate the problem. On the one hand, Pojman distinguishes direct or 
descriptive volitionalism that he describes as "the thesis that we can will directly to 
believe propositions."34 This is certainly acceptable as an adequate definition for direct 
volitionalism. On the other hand, Pojman defines indirect volitionalism as "prescriptive," 
holding that it is "the thesis that we ought to will to believe indirectly, get ourselves in the 
state of mind where we will come to believe what we do not now believe [my 
emphasis]."35 Pojman's definition of indirect volitionalism is seriously misleading, for 
Pojman inappropriately transforms it into an unacceptable theory that in some of its 
32 Louis P. Pojman- Religious Belief and the Will. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986. 
33 C. Stephen Evans - "Does Kierkegaard think beliefs can be directly willed?" in Philosophy of Religion, 
vol. 26, no. 3, Dec., 1989, p. 173. 
34 L. P. Pojman- "Belief and Will", p. 2. 
35 L. P. Pojman- "Belief and Will", p. 2. 
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versions allows prescriptivism. 
According to Pojman, the direct and indirect positions are confused and 
morally suspect, respectively. Nonetheless, my contention is that indirect volitionalism 
can be outlined without reference to any alleged prescriptive character, simply by 
removing "ought to" from the above definition. The prescriptive position as he presents it 
is wide open to a trenchant rebuttal of volitionalism. But what is the real nature of such 
claims, if any, in a volitionalist approach? Kierkegaard's volitionalism is one of the main 
targets of the contemporary debate over this issue. He represents a "more extravagant 
dual position,"36 at the edge between descriptive and prescriptive volitionalism. What I 
will later try to determine is the sort of "prescriptivism" he in fact introduces. 
Pojman challenges Wisdo's claim that Kierkegaard holds a weak 
volitionalism. He defines strong volitionalism as the view that maintains that "we may 
choose to believe anything we wish to believe that is not contradictory for us,"37 whereas 
weak volitionalism only holds, like Wisdo, that "the uncertainty of our contingent beliefs 
must be negated by the wi11."38 Pojman fears that this is a distinction without any 
differentiation and rejects Wisdo's view. But in fact Wisdo's remark is relevant as regards 
the role that Kierkegaard allows to subjective involvement, more specifically to the will, 
in assenting to and assuming a certain proposition. Wisdo thus brings out the need for 
subjective certainty that enables one to believe a proposition, especially when confronted 
36 L. P. Pojman- "Belief and Will", p. 3. 
37 Louis P. Pojman - "Kierkegaard on Faith and Freedom", International Journal for Philosophy of 
Religion, vol. 27, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990, p. 57. 
38 David Wisdo- "Kierkegaard on Belief, Faith, and Explanation", in International Journal for Philosophy 
of Religion, vol. 21, no. 2, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1987, p. 98. 
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with "objective uncertainty" and act accordingly. 
In his review of Religious Belief and the Will, Evans highlights Pojman's 
brief but careful investigation of the occurrence of the concepts of faith, belief, and the 
will in a large number of philosophical writings, from antiquity to developments on the 
issue of whether will controls belief in contemporary analytic philosophy. Evans shows 
that Pojman considers Kierkegaard a direct, descriptive volitionalist, being said to "hold 
the extreme position that all of our beliefs are acquired by direct acts of wi11"39 , 
independently of evidential considerations. Evans amends Pojman's "most uncharitable 
interpretation of the volitionalism,"40 especially in relation to Pojman' s attributing the 
thesis that beliefs are under the direct control of the will to Kierkegaard. Against that, 
Evans makes clear that in the Philosophical Fragments (Philosophiske Smuler), 
Kierkegaard's pseudonym, Climacus, discusses the role of the will, as a subjective 
contribution to the formation of beliefs, in the context of a "skeptical epistemology, in 
which it is argued that objective evidence is always insufficient to determine beliefs about 
[ ... ] matters [of fact]. "41 
Due to so many controversies, the issue of Kierkegaard's volitionalism is 
complicated. A more detailed discussion of the main arguments in the debate is therefore 
necessary. So I will address some of the main arguments in the dispute over the nature of 
the role of the will in belief, in the light of the above distinctions and considerations. 
39 C. S. Evans - "Does Kierkegaard think beliefs can be directly willed?," p. 173. Cf. Pojman, Religious 
Belief and the Will, p. 146. 
40 C. S. Evans- "Book Review: Louis P. Pojman's Religious Belief and The Will", p. 49. 
41 C. S. Evans- "Book Review: Louis P. Pojman's Religious Belief and The Will", p. 48. 
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The Debate 
The role of the will 
Pojman considers that belief can be defined as a "judgement about the truth 
value of propositions,"42 holding that belief aims at truth about objective states of affairs 
independently of subjective wishes, will or desire. He writes: "If I could believe simply 
by willing to, my beliefs would not be reliable guides for action. Beliefs would not report 
states of affairs in the world but would simply be records of my wants. If believing aims 
at truth, it is hard to see what the will could possibly have to do with it - in any direct 
sense at least."43 This rebuttal of direct volitionalism has the same grounds as 
Schellenberg's, for both Pojman and Schellenberg emphasize that our willed beliefs have 
a paralyzing effect on our actions since realizing that they rely on no other evidence than 
the justification of the will would prevent us from taking them seriously and acting upon 
them. My contrary contention is that sometimes it is in fact necessary to choose to believe 
a certain proposition in order to proceed to action, especially when there is only weak or 
indecisive evidence available and relying simply on trust becomes the unique 
justification. Also, "aiming at truth" refers to the epistemic or propositional component of 
belief ("believing-that") but, as long as doubt is possible, it is difficult to reach objective 
certainty with regard to the truth. As a result, it is mainly the evaluative component 
("believing-in") of belief that takes the lead as a practical guide for our actions. 
42 L. P. Pojman- "Belief and Will", p. 3. 
43 L. P. Pojman- "Belief and Will", p. 5. 
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Nevertheless, Pojman admits that all believing involves the will, but only in 
an indirect manner, for sometimes "the beliefs we arrive at are finally the result of our 
policy decisions,"44 i.e., the way we choose to live our lives eventually brings about what 
we believe in. Pojman accepts a form of indirect volitionalism in which one is held 
responsible for the beliefs resulting from the decisions made; yet he argues against 
prescriptivism, which he considers to be an unacceptable form of indirect volitionalism. 
Pojman claims that Kierkegaard is one of the extreme examples of prescriptive 
volitionalism. 
Prescriptivism 
Pojman states that prescriptivists' disregard for the truth may be considered 
immoral. In his ethics of belief in nuce, he claims that "whereas the truth seeker's advice 
is: if you would have true beliefs, pay attention to the evidence, test hypotheses, judge 
impartially, and so forth; the prescriptivist's advice is: if you would be happy (or saved or 
whatever), believe that p."45 Here Pojman criticizes the instrumental role of a view of 
belief that, disregarding the truth, aims at happiness. Prescriptivism is morally suspect, for 
it attempts "to treat belief instrumentally."46 Let us discuss prescriptivism in more detail. 
In one of his articles published in 1954, Price admits that one can properly 
be said to choose what to believe from several alternative answers when confronted with 
a complex question. However, he says, some philosophers have gone further, maintaining 
44 L. P. Pojman- "Belief and Will", p. 9. 
45 L. P. Pojman- "Belief and Will", p. 11. 
46 L. P. Pojman- "Belief and Will", p. 14. 
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that "belief is at least sometimes a matter of moral obligation; that there are circumstances 
in which a man ought to believe a proposition p or disbelieve a proposition q [ ... ], 
[meaning that] he is morally obliged to believe [that proposition and] that he will be 
morally blameworthy if he fails to believe it, and still more so if he disbelieves it."47 
Moreover, Price notes that those who hold such doctrines about the duty to 
believe "even think that in some circumstances a man is morally obliged to believe a 
proposition p even though the evidence which he has may be unfavourable to it; or that he 
is morally obliged to go on believing it as firmly as before, even when the evidence for 
the proposition is weakened, or the evidence against it is strengthened, as a result of some 
new piece of information he has acquired."48 Under these premises, this doctrine says that 
we have a moral duty to hold fast to our beliefs, even when we are confronted with some 
irrefutable piece of evidence to the contrary and despite the strong inclination to 
discharge our obsolete beliefs. In this case, as Price puts it, the doctrine of moral 
obligation urges us to resist such inclinations: "you can resist them, if you try hard 
enough."49 The problem is that because it is possible to make such an effort, it does not 
imply that it is also necessary to do it, so there is no moral obligation to believe. 
Therefore, any attempt at configuring an "ethics of belief' is for Price inappropriate. 50 
In this context, Price admits that "if or to the extent that believing is 
something under our voluntary control, it does at any rate make sense to say that X ought, 
47 H. H. Price- "The inaugural address. Belief and Will", in Aristotelian Society Proceedings, Suppl. vol. 
28, London: Harrison and Sons, Ltd., 1954, p. 1. 
48 H. H. Price- "The inaugural address. Belief and Will", pp. 1-2. 
49 H. H. Price- "The inaugural address. Belief and Will", p. 15. 
5° Cf. H. H. Price- "The inaugural address. Belief and Will", p. 26. 
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is morally bound, to believe a proposition p, and ought not to believe q or has no moral 
right to believe it."51 This doctrine can have horrifying consequences (e.g., the 
punishments of the Inquisition), unless we admit that this sort of "prescriptivism" is only 
relatively acceptable. For example, from a Hindu ethical-religious perspective (i.e., from 
a relative standpoint), it is both a moral and a religious duty to hold certain beliefs about 
the necessity of protecting all living creatures and, more importantly, act in conformity 
with those beliefs. But should one be punished in case of disbelief? Of course not, if only 
deeds are imputable. The way one chooses to make use of one's freedom of thought is to 
be evaluated only after one's subsequent actions. It seems that Price agrees with this 
when he writes: "But though we may sometimes have a moral obligation to express belief 
or to act as if we believed [or not] - things which certainly are under our voluntary 
control - it will not of course follow from this that we ever have a moral obligation to 
believe (or not to believe, as the case may be )."52 
Although the project of an ethics of belief is controversial, it still introduces 
the idea that beliefs are to be entertained and accepted or rejected in accordance with 
specific criteria. Let us see now what criteria have been claimed to offer a good and 
reasonable justification of our beliefs. 
Criteria for the reasonableness of (non-)belief 
It is very likely that what Schellenberg has called the "reasonableness of 
51 H. H. Price- "The inaugural address. Belief and Will", p. I 1. 
52 H. H. Price- "The inaugural address. Belief and Will", p. 13. 
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non-belief'53 can be well described in Price's terms: "what prevents a man from believing 
a proposition p, what makes him unable to believe it, is just the fact that he is taking a 
reasonable attitude to this proposition."54 Price lists two criteria that determine the 
reasonableness of belief: consistency and evidence, and he suggests that "when the 
proposition we are considering is about matters of fact (i.e., is not a proposition of logic 
or pure mathematics) the evidential criterion of reasonableness, and not the consistency 
criterion, is much the more important between the two."55 Price uses the example of a 
duck-billed platypus in order to illustrate this view, saying that despite its currently 
testified presence in the animal world, all available zoological justification once 
prevented scientists from believing that such a creature ever existed. For Price, "the 
policy of believing in accordance with the evidence is the only one which will ensure that 
the propositions we believe are more likely to be true than false."56 
When Price describes the problem of the reasonableness of our beliefs, he 
indirectly offers strong arguments for skeptical epistemological claims. On the one hand, 
as Price remarks, "what one is reasonably incapable of believing may nevertheless be 
true."57 Scientists once reasonably believed that the duck-billed platypus did not exist, 
although later evidence did confirm the contrary. On the other hand, "if or so far as you 
are reasonable in your believing, the propositions you are unable to believe are likely to 
be on the whole and in the long run false rather then true."58 Rejecting the idea that the 
53 I shall discuss Schellenberg's view separately, in Chapter Three. 
54 H. H. Price- "The inaugural address. Belief and Will", p. 3. 
55 H. H. Price- "The inaugural address. Belief and Will", p. 5. 
56 H. H. Price- "The inaugural address. Belief and Will", p. 26. 
57 H. H. Price- "The inaugural address. Belief and Will", p. 5. 
58 H. H. Price- "The inaugural address. Belief and Will", pp. 5-6. 
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earth is flat indeed seems to be a reasonable attitude towards the beliefs about its shape. 
In conclusion, as Price puts it, on the one hand "what makes me unable to believe a 
proposition p may be pure prejudice or stupidity or sheer cussedness; but p may be false 
for all that, [whereas, on the other hand] what makes it easy for me to believe another 
proposition q may be something equally unreasonable; nevertheless, q may happen to be 
true."59 
Disposition vs. occurrence and assent 
Price supports a dispositional view of belief. But although for him believing 
a proposition is a disposition and not an occurrence, there is nevertheless "a characteristic 
sort of mental occurrence ["assent"] which we may sometimes notice when we are in 
process of acquiring such a disposition."60 That amounts in fact to saying that "once 
belief-disposition has established itself, one of the many different ways in which it may 
manifest itself thereafter is by subsequent acts of assenting or assent-occurrences."61 It is 
not entirely clear what "established itself' means here, other than indicating an 
occurrence, but if it meant more the whole theory of dispositional belief would have to be 
restructured, and this is what Price does not allow. Assent has a preferential character, 
Price says, and because of that it may sometimes be understood as a voluntary choice, 
although "it is not in your power to avoid assenting to the proposition which the evidence 
(your evidence) favours, or to assent instead to some other proposition when the evidence 
59 H. H. Price- "The inaugural address. Belief and Will", p. 6. 
60 H. H. Price- "The inaugural address. Belief and Will", p. 15. 
61 H. H. Price- "The inaugural address. Belief and Will", p. 15. 
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(your evidence) is manifestly unfavourable to it."62 
Volitional control 
Price admits that, up to a point, one can voluntarily control one's beliefs, but 
"indirectly, though not directly, and over a period of time, though not instantaneously,"63 
by means of a gradual cultivation of beliefs. When adverse evidence confronts us with the 
threat of losing our belief, "we [nevertheless] have in our power to weaken our doubts 
little by little, until at last they fade away and are felt no longer [ ... ], a thing that one can 
do (usually) if one tries hard enough and long enough, and thereby one can voluntarily 
restore or revive a belief which one was in danger of losing."64 
The ground for this "gradual belief-restoring procedure" can indeed be 
offered by the fact that evidence is often inadequate, or by the possibility of there being 
some missing alternative explanation. Sometimes the missing alternative cannot prevent 
us from believing a proposition, for, as Price puts it, "we only need beliefs at all as a 
substitute for knowledge where knowledge is not available, or not at present available [my 
emphasis]."65 This is often the case with the evidence offered in court. The jury is 
compelled to choose believing something on the ground of available evidence, even if it 
might well be the case (and it frequently is) that new evidence might eventually prove the 
contrary. 
62 H. H. Price- "The inaugural address. Belief and Will", p. 16. 
63 H. H. Price - "The inaugural address. Belief and Will", p. 16. 
64 H. H. Price - "The inaugural address. Belief and Will", p. 17. 
65 H. H. Price - "The inaugural address. Belief and Will", p. 17. This will be relevant for Kierkegaard's 
distinction between belief and knowledge. 
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Price points to another procedure of volitional control of beliefs, a method 
that is "not concerned with the evidence for or against the proposition one wishes to 
believe or to go on believing."66 In various religions (but this can easily be the case also 
in some fancy restaurant kitchens too), the "Word" of the sacred books (or the recipe 
book for that matter) is taken to be holy and beyond any shade of doubt. This type of 
commitment can occur as the result of a reiterated effort to dwell on the proposition that 
one wants to believe, but it can be also produced involuntarily, as the outcome of 
education. All things considered, this is the sort of belief that does not require any 
evidential justification (pro or con), for it is grounded on an unshakeable commitment 
based on trust. 
Direct vs. indirect volitional control 
Holyer does not consider that the differentiation between direct and indirect 
influences is a clear-cut distinction though, for he argues that "it is impossible to admit 
certain kinds of indirect influence without also admitting some degree of direct 
influence."67 Holyer also argues that "many forms of indirect control involve a degree of 
direct control"68 , except in the cases of the strictly indirect control in which "I want to 
believe p, search for evidence of its truth without turning my back on relevant contrary 
evidence and come to believe p only when I have found sufficient evidence for it."69 The 
controversy as regards the direct vs. indirect influence of the will is of minor import for 
66 H. H. Price - 'The inaugural address. Belief and Will", p. 19. 
67 R. Holyer- "Belief and Will Revisited", p. 274. 
68 R. Holyer- "Belief and Will Revisited", p. 281. 
69 R. Holyer- "Belief and Will Revisited", p. 282. 
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Holyer as regards the attempt to determine the way in which the will affects our beliefs, 
for it makes an irrelevant distinction the core of the issue. Despite that, he acknowledges 
that a great deal of the debate focuses on that problem, especially when trying to label 
certain philosophies, like Kierkegaard' s for instance, as "direct" or "indirect 
volitionalism." 
As defined by Holyer, "a direct influence is understood simply as choosing 
to believe or disbelieve a certain proposition," whereas, "indirect influence is more a 
matter of choosing to act or to direct one's attention in a certain way or to submit oneself 
to certain strong influences, [which will] in the long term [ ... ] affect the beliefs a person 
holds."70 The controversy bears on the possibility of the former, i.e., the possibility of a 
direct influence of the will on belief, especially in the case of belief by fiat. In other 
words, as Pojman puts it, whereas "direct volitionalism is contested, indirect volitionalism 
is uncontroversial."71 The problem is that the opponents of direct volitionalism narrowly 
focus their criticisms on the case of beliefs by fiat. But, as Holyer appropriately argues, 
ruling out beliefs by fiat does not automatically exclude the possibility of there being any 
directly volitional element in belief whatsoever. 
Holyer asserts that belief is volitional without claiming that "it always 
involves a conscious choice, but rather that there are ways in which our beliefs could be 
different as a direct result of our own agency."72 He argues that "knowledge as well as 
70 R. Holyer- "Belief and Will Revisited", p. 274. 
71 L. P. Pojman- "A Critique of Holyer's Volitionalism", p. 695. 
72 R. Holyer- "Belief and Will Revisited", p. 276. 
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belief is voluntary."73 In other words, the will has a direct influence on our beliefs and our 
knowledge. The alternate position (Classen, Pojman) suggests that "we can choose to 
deliberate and to investigate and indirectly to control our beliefs, but we can in no sense 
choose to believe."74 But as Holyer points out, "if we deny that belief is in any direct 
sense voluntary, the alternative we face is either to deny that we can avoid beliefs by 
putting them out of mind[ ... ] or to say of one who does that he is really a believer."75 
Holyer considers that beliefs that cannot be based on empirical evidence, and 
cannot be inferred from other beliefs or be self-evident, are traditionally viewed as 'first 
principles', i.e., "a wide range of beliefs including fundamental moral and metaphysical 
beliefs as well as basic epistemic norms (e.g., true beliefs are those supported by 
evidence; the contradiction of a belief with other strongly evidenced beliefs counts 
against it, etc.)."76 The justification of these beliefs appeals to the existence of "some 
form of intuition," the "light of nature" (or reason), the "fitness of things," etc. These 
kinds of beliefs cannot be chosen, though, and, as a consequence, there is no question of 
direct influence of will on such beliefs. As Holyer's main concern is not with the logic of 
intuitive beliefs 77 , I suspect that, when he describes believing any first principle as "a 
matter of choice,"78 he refers to our assent to believe, separating the way first principles 
are acquired from the way they are accepted as truths. This is challenged by one of his 
critics. 
73 R. Holyer- "Belief and Will Revisited", p. 279. 
74 R. Holyer- "Belief and Will Revisited", p. 280. 
75 R. Holyer- "Belief and Will Revisited", p. 280. 
76 R. Holyer- "Belief and Will Revisited", p. 284. 
77 Cf. R. Holyer- "Belief and Will Revisited", p. 285. 
78 R. Holyer- "Belief and Will Revisited", p. 289. 
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Holyer' s argument 
Louis P. Pojman offers a brief outline of Holyer's argument and rejects most 
of his contentions. Pojman identifies five central theses in Holyer' s "account of a 
reconstructed version of direct volitionalism:"79 
1. Certain kinds of indirect influence on belief entail some degree of direct 
influence. Hence, since it is uncontroversial that we have indirect control of our 
believing, it must be admitted that we have some direct control over our belief 
acquisitions also. 
2. To deliberate over a proposition is to directly control our beliefs, for in 
investigating and in terminating deliberation we cause our beliefs to be formed. 
When we are deliberating, we are exercising direct control of our beliefs. 
3. Choosing criteria through which to assess a belief is a volitional act. Hence, 
since the criteria are directly involved in assent, we have some direct influence on 
our beliefs. 
4. We can easily separate our wants and intentions from our belief states. They are 
tied together in a more direct manner than those who have rejected direct 
volitionalism have understood. 
5. One of the ways in which we can affect our belief acquisitions is by directly 
preventing the belief from taking hold on us through a sort of veto power on the 
proposed belief. 
Pojman thinks that most of what Holyer contends can be regarded as a non-
volitional account of belief formation which only emphasizes the distinction between 
direct and indirect causal effects of the will on belief acquisition. Pojman dismisses most 
of Holyer' s arguments, with the exception of the one in which Holyer considers our 
"ability to withhold assent through turning away from the evidence."80 But even this has a 
non-volitional aspect, Pojman argues. 
Pojman claims that "our veto powers can circumscribe our beliefs, 
79 L. P. Pojman- "A Critique of Holyer's Volitionalism", pp. 695-696. 
80 L. P. Pojman- "A Critique of Holyer's Volitionalism", p. 699. 
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preserving the status quo and preventing new candidates from making entry,"81 without 
endowing the will with a causal role. Pojman adds that "there is a veto-power of the mind 
which is volitional and does closely affect the beliefs we obtain, but this negative action 
can be construed as a fencing in of a belief, a protecting it rather than a volitional act."82 
Relying on the distinction between cause and condition, Pojman concludes that what a 
non-volitionalist maintains is "not that there is no direct influence of the will on belief, 
but that the will does not directly cause belief."83 In this case, the real problem is to assess 
if there is a causal relation, i.e., if the will has a role to play in the formation of beliefs. If 
not, then we would only need to evaluate the influence of the will and determine its place 
in relation to belief. 
A Critique of the Debate 
Against the claim that any form of prescriptivism is inappropriate, I hold that 
a minimal ethics of belief is nonetheless necessary. Without that, it would be difficult to 
assess the relation between an employee and the specific set of job related duties, for 
instance. In difficult weather conditions, an air pilot has to rely exclusively on the 
guidance from the control tower, and thus voluntarily believe the directions that are said 
to be necessary. Contrary evidence can be misleading. Let us consider some additional 
81 L P. Pojman- "A Critique of Holyer's Volitionalism", p. 699. 
82 L P. Pojman- "A Critique of Holyer's Volitionalism", p. 699. 
83 L. P. Pojman- "A Critique ofHolyer's Volitionalism", p. 699. 
35 
examples. The cruise ship commander who chooses not to trust the maps and the radar 
but rather his or her instincts or the vague empirical evidence of a lighthouse weakly 
gleaming out of the fog might end the journey in shipwreck, for which only he or she is 
responsible. 
The above situations are some of the many in which it can be easily admitted 
that at least on certain occasions we can ground our beliefs only voluntarily, on trust. Let 
us consider the situation of a blind man who chooses to trust the guide dog without 
questioning the surrounding noises that only seem to offer contrary evidence. Or, he can 
choose to follow his instincts or any other evidential support and thus correctly identify 
the danger and trust the testimony of the walking stick instead. This ambiguity is actually 
the main reason why, from a skeptical perspective, objective evidence cannot be trusted 
nor can objective truth be easily reached. But on many "blind choice occasions" action is 
immediately necessary, as any military commander will testify. A decision has to be 
without delay made in situ, and when there is not enough evidential justification for our 
beliefs, the will is all there is. That certainly implies trust and a certain amount of risk; but 
the quest for knowledge is a struggle and is never effortless. 
There is indeed a problem with relying only on material evidence. To do so 
would annihilate progress in the sciences. For example, it is often the case in science that 
only after theoretical hypotheses have been theoretically established are they tested by 
means of empirical procedures, in order to gain material evidence. A theory can be false, 
of course, but it is not unusual to admit that "sometimes we cannot acquire true [beliefs] 
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without holding false ones first, and then testing them and finding them to be false."84 
As regards the issue of direct vs. indirect control, in my view the indirect 
volitional control of our beliefs is nothing but a direct one extended over a longer period 
of time. Some beliefs occur instantaneously, and we must decide whether to assent to 
them or not and immediately act accordingly. But there are also beliefs in statu nascendi 
that need to germinate first before entering the fabric of one's existence. In both cases it is 
under the direct control of our will to entertain, assent, and cultivate such beliefs and 
therefore we are unquestionably responsible for them and for the dispositional behaviour 
and actions associated with them. For instance, it can be the case that my environmental 
awareness occurred spontaneously and I directly willed to believe and assented to it. Or it 
may be that it was in fact inculcated by social conditioning and I voluntarily but indirectly 
cultivated it over a long period of time. But what is particularly important is that I am 
responsible for each and every subsequent action I take. 
Some additional remarks are necessary with regard to the nature of assent. I 
agree with Holyer' s contention that one of the real issues in asserting or denying a direct 
role for the will in belief is "whether assent follows automatically from an understanding 
of the evidence."85 He argues that it does not always follow instantly, for "in the matter of 
belief we are not simply the unwitting victims of the evidence we encounter."86 After 
carefully entertaining a certain proposition we usually express our agreement or 
disagreement with it, our assent to it or our refusal to believe that it is a true proposition. 
84 H. H. Price- "The inaugural address. Belief and Will", p. 25. 
85 R. Holyer- "Belief and Will Revisited", p. 275. 
86 R. Holyer- "Belief and Will Revisited", p. 275. 
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We can also withhold our evaluation or postpone it until new evidence is obtained. 
We should all agree that such delay is not invariably acceptable due to once 
in a while life-threatening time constraints. For example, a lifeguard does not 
systematically ponder whether the swimmer who seems to be in trouble decided to fake 
the danger or is indeed at jeopardy, for immediate action is believed to be necessary. 
When the decision making process needs to be brief, a choice is always made, which in 
this case is to intrude into the development of events and make sure the swimmer finds 
himself at no risk whatsoever. The choice to interfere is due to a previous commitment 
though; it is a reiterated choice that disregards the (un)likely misleading appearances. The 
lifeguard willingly assents to and commits herself to her duty. 
On the question of whether belief is an occurrence or a disposition, it is 
worth noticing that, against Pojman, Evans states that "belief is an occurrence, not an act 
we can directly control and be responsible for." 87 They both claim that belief is an 
occurrence but disagree about whether the will has a role to play in relation to it. My 
claim is that in a sense they both are right: belief is indeed an occurrence, for it is 
acquired independently of our choice, but it also requires our voluntarily choosing to 
cultivate or discharge that belief. 
Evans does not accept Pojman's interpretation of volitionalism in terms of 
"self-deception, or 'lying to oneself' ."88 Pojman's volitionalist knows that something is 
not so, or at least has strong evidence for that, but despite that voluntarily decides to 
87 C. Stephen Evans- "Louis P. Pojman, The Logic of Subjectivity: Kierkegaard's Philosophy of Religion", 
in Christian Scholar's Review, XIV: 3, 1985, p. 304. 
88 C. S. Evans- "Book Review: Louis P. Pojman's Religious Belief and The Will", p. 49. 
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believe the contrary. From this, Pojman concludes that the will plays only an indirect and 
conditional role in the formation of belief. On this point though, as Evans explains, the 
volitionalist might claim that even in the situation when good and sufficient evidence is 
provided for a belief "the agent still must choose to believe."89 That implicitly amounts to 
saying that the believer is only potentially so. For example, in the situation when I have 
reasonably reliable evidence for believing that I see an iceberg in the distance, I can still 
suddenly be haunted by an obsessive de omnibus dubitandum est and as a consequence 
withhold assent to that proposition. Nevertheless, if I choose to believe that proposition, 
trusting and relying on the testimony of my senses, then I can surely make plans for 
jumping in a boat and try taking pictures. 
Conclusion 
I have tried to show that belief is an occurrence that has to be entertained 
and offered assent. I also argued in support of the view that there is a certain prescriptive 
character of volitionalism that cannot be uncritically dismissed, offering the framework 
for a minimal ethics of belief in which only associated actions are imputable. I offered 
examples and discussed the fact that, in general, but especially in the case of insufficient 
evidential support, one willingly decides whether to grant or withhold assent to certain 
propositions. I thus indicated that beliefs are determined by means of a direct application 
of the will. I now turn to the controversial case of Kierkegaard' s volitionalism. 
89 C. S. Evans- "Book Review: Louis P. Pojman's Religious Belief and The Will", p. 50. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Kierkegaard's Psychology of Belief and Faith 
MOTTO: "When Johannes Climacus90, master of inactivity, lit 
up a new cigar in the cafe in Frederiksberg Gardens, he 
resolved to make things more difficult for humanity."91 
Introductory Note 
In Kierkegaard, "belief' or "faith" (i.e., Tro [Danish], in both cases) is "the 
expression for man's existential relation to 'the eternal,' [but as] the eternal can show 
itself to man in different shapes, [there are] also different forms for belief/faith."92 There 
are two basic meanings of the Kierkegaardian term Tro. In Danish, the word Tro signifies 
both 'belief' (in the sense of 'belief-that', to use Price's terminology) and 'faith' ('belief-
in'). The two different meanings are reflected in Kierkegaard's own use of the term. He 
distinguishes between, on the one hand, a direct and ordinary meaning, and, on the other 
hand, what he designates as being the "wholly eminent sense"93 of the word (i.e., 'faith' 
or 'belief in', like in 'belief in God' [Tro paa Gud]). Thus, faith is a species of belief or, 
90 The problem of pseudonymity in Kierkegaard's authorship should be mentioned. While recognizing its 
great importance, I will nonetheless ignore it here for practical purposes, since it would unnecessarily 
complicate the exposition of the arguments involved. Therefore I will refer indifferently to both 
Kierkegaard and his pseudonyms. 
91 Lee C. Barrett - "Subjectivity is (un)truth. Climacus 's dialectically sharpened pathos", in S¢ren 
Kierkegaard. Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers, Daniel W. Conway and K. E. Gover, ed. 
(vol. II: "Epistemology and Psychology: Kierkegaard and the Recoil from Freedom"), London; New 
York: Routledge, 2002, p. 22. 
92 Gregor Malantschuk- N¢glebegreber i Kierkegaards ta:nkning, Copenhagen: Reitzel, 1993, p. 193. (my 
translation) 
93 S. Kierkegaard- Philosophical Fragments, p. 87. 
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as Evans puts it, "faith is ordinary belief which is also faith or belief in the eminent 
sense."94 Pojman indicates that "there is no clear conceptual analysis of these terms, and 
[that] the Danish word (Tro) [ ... ] is similar to the English term 'faith' and 'belief', 
including both the propositional aspect of 'belief' and the trustful emphasis of 'faith' ."95 
Actually, the English word 'trust' is considered to be of Scandinavian origin, one more 
reason to describe 'belief in' as a form of 'trust.' Kierkegaard uses Tro in a manifold 
manner but in this thesis, for practical purposes, I will distinguish only between three 
different senses of belief: ordinary sense ("belief that"), belief as trust ("belief in"), and a 
special case of "belief in," i.e., Christian faith, which is precisely what Kierkegaard calls 
"the wholly eminent sense" of belief. 
There has been a great deal of debate on the overall design of Kierkegaard's 
authorship, in genere, but also with particular reference to what his position relative to the 
the matter of Tro is. I will try to show that investigating Kierkegaard' s perspective can be 
very helpful in determining the relation of will to belief. 
Let us first examine Kierkegaard's position, focusing on what he terms 
"objective uncertainty," and its role in relation to belief in what he calls the "absolute 
paradox," i.e., the object of faith in Christianity. I shall then try to offer a brief account 
and assessment of the relation between belief and knowledge in Kierkegaard. Finally, I 
will try to defend the claim that religious belief is not a form of knowledge but a gift of 
94 C. S. Evans- "Does Kierkegaard think beliefs can be directly willed?", p. 175. 
95 L.P. Pojman- "Kierkegaard on Faith and Freedom", p. 45. It is worth noticing in fact, with Pojman, that 
"Kierkegaard has at least seven different uses of the concept [of Tro] which are regulated - in large 
measure - by their context within the stages" (p. 44 ). According to Pojman, Tro has a wide range of 
significations, including aesthetic faith, ethical commitment, religious and Christian faith, but also 
opinion (Mening), faith as hope, and "belief as an organ of apprehension of the past" (p.45). 
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grace which requires a choice and subjective commitment, for it shapes and defines our 
individuality and our "view of life" (Kierkegaard's Livsanskuelse). 
Kierkegaard's Argument 
Evans contends that "to Pojman Kierkegaard does the sort of things 
contemporary analytic philosophers do: he sets forward theses and defends them by 
analyzing concepts and constructing arguments for his theses."96 In particular, what 
Pojman says is that Kierkegaard advances "an argument designed to prove the truth of 
Christianity,'m an argument unwrapped by Pojman into the following claims: "( 1) 
objectivity and subjectivity are mutually exclusive ways of knowing absolute truth; (2) 
objectivity fails, so subjectivity is the only viable route; (3) Christian faith provides the 
only proper kind of subjectivity to achieve this truth."98 
Evans argues that Pojman lacks support for his claims and that his criticisms 
are, in the end, only "valuable against popular 'Kierkegaardianism,' even if they do not 
devastate [Kierkegaard] himself."99 Evans concludes: "Reading Pojman's book is a 
frustrating reminder of how elusive and hard to understand [Kierkegaard] really is." 100 Let 
us therefore explore some of the main interpretations of Kierkegaard's account of the 
96 C. S. Evans- "Louis P. Pojman, The Logic of Subjectivity, p. 303. 
97 C. S. Evans- "Louis P. Pojman, The Logic of Subjectivity", p. 303. 
98 C. S. Evans- "Louis P. Pojman, The Logic of Subjectivity", p. 303. 
99 C. S. Evans- "Louis P. Pojman, The Logic of Subjectivity", p. 304. 
100 C. S. Evans- "Louis P. Pojman, The Logic of Subjectivity", p. 304. 
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nature of faith. 
Gregory Schufreider acknowledges that, while reading Kierkegaard's 
Concluding Unscientific Postscript, he has been struck by the presence of a "rational 
argument imbedded in the central section which claims that truth is subjectivity." 101 
Kierkegaard's claim is that "subjectivity is the truth." 102 Schufreider maintains that "the 
logic of that reasoning" can be summarized in a series of numbered claims 103 , some of 
which I will discuss below. 
Objective uncertainty and the paradox 
Let us see first what Schufreider says about the controversial Kierkegaardian 
"objective uncertainty." The starting point is the contention that "objective uncertainty is 
conceptually related to belief, and is a condition for the appropriateness of belief claims 
such that if an idea is objectively certain, this precludes the possibility of belief, in the 
relevant sense, that is, where 'belief' signifies my decisively committing myself."(claim 
3). We need to separate belief on two different levels: epistemic and foundational. On the 
one hand, epistemic belief aims at objective certainty, but when it fails and as a 
consequence we end up in intolerable uncertainty with regard to objective truths, then the 
only way out from the cul-de-sac of epistemic skepticism is foundational belief. Thus, it 
can be easily gathered that objective uncertainty promotes the growth of subjective 
101 Gregory Schufreider- "Kierkegaard on Belief Without Justification", in International Journal for 
Philosophy of Religion, vol. 12, no. 3, Martin us Nijhoff Publishers, 1981, p. 149. 
102 S. Kierkegaard- Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968, p. 
191. 
103 See claims 1-14, in G. Schufreider- "Kierkegaard on Belief Without Justification", pp. 149-150. 
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certainty: the greater the objective uncertainty, the stronger the subjective certainty that it 
conditions (claim 6: "The greater the degree of objective uncertainty an idea enjoys, the 
greater its potency for fostering subjectivity."). To follow Price's distinction, what 
separates the propositional aspect of belief from the evaluative is the real import the latter 
has on the way we ground and structure our existence, for "in the relevant sense" belief 
points to voluntary commitments and actions. 
Schufreider' s claim 4 is: "If an idea is uncertain objectively, and therefore a 
possible object for belief, I may base that belief nonetheless on the degree of objective 
certainty shown by evidence for it, or it may be of such a sort that there is no evidence for 
it. In either case, the category of belief remains appropriate." It follows that evidence is 
not necessarily indispensable for foundational beliefs. We might have some evidence for 
the object of our foundational belief and even use it, but it is sometimes the case that at 
least direct empirical evidence is very difficult or even impossible to get. In that situation 
we choose to believe a certain proposition (e.g., the earth is flat) and base our image of 
the world we live in relying on one or another form of trust, whether the testimony 
offered by others or the "light of reason." 
In claim 5 ("Faith is that species of belief in which my commitment cannot 
be mediated by objective evidence."), belief suffers a sudden metamorphosis and turns 
itself into faith, i.e., the "eminent sense" in which Kierkegaard envisages Tro. But in my 
view this is just another name for the case discussed above in claim 4, for religious belief 
also relies on trust in case of total lack of objective evidence as regards the object of faith. 
Schufreider indicates a very important distinction within the sphere of 
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objective uncertainty itself. In claim 7, he writes that: "Ideas which are necessarily 
uncertain objectively have a greater potency for inciting subjectivity than ideas which are 
contingently uncertain; i.e., ideas which are in principle unverifiable are superior to ideas 
which are in principle verifiable but have not yet been verified, for inciting the subject 
into its subjectivity.") Thus Schufreider holds that when faced with the definite 
impossibility of obtaining evidence, i.e., when the possibility of verifiability is ruled out 
with necessity, this condition stimulates subjective interest, for in this case belief-choices 
have to be made relying simply on trust. Accordingly, contingency matters less. 
Schufreider also points to some of the features of belief in the eminent sense 
of faith 104• Not only does the object of faith lack objective evidence, but objective 
evidence is necessarily impossible to obtain (claim 7, see above), because the object of 
faith, i.e., what Kierkegaard calls "the absolute paradox," is a "necessarily uncertain idea" 
(claim 9: "[ ... ] i.e., an idea which while self-contradictory is acknowledged by reason to 
stand outside its domain, thus necessarily remaining uncertain objectively."). 
It is quite difficult in fact to assess at this point whether Kierkegaard 
designates a form of logical paradox, a logical contradiction, or some other type of 
contradiction (Modsigelse) as the object of faith. For present purposes, I will take it that 
Kierkegaard does not hold that "the absolute paradox" is a logical contradiction. Rather, 
he holds that it is an ontological contradiction, in that in Christianity the object of faith is 
a unity of irreconcilable opposites: the eternal and the temporal. Kierkegaard indicates the 
same opposition at the core of many other Christian beliefs as well. For example, 
104 See especially Schufreider's claims 8-11, in G. Schufreider - "Kierkegaard on Belief Without 
Justification", p. 150. 
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Kierkegaard holds that "the forgiveness of sin is indeed a paradox insofar as the eternal 
truth is related to an existing [and thus temporal or "historical"] person." 105 Certainly, it 
might be argued that there is nothing ontologically "paradoxical" about the synthesis of 
time and eternity in that way. Nevertheless, the object of faith (and the belief in the 
forgiveness of sin, for that matter) still remains a "necessarily uncertain idea." 106 The 
object of faith is "objectively uncertain." 
Faith and Paradox 
As the "absolute paradox" designates the presence of an eternal God in time, 
Kierkegaard holds that "faith [Tro] is not a knowledge, for [ ... ] no knowledge can have as 
its object this absurdity that the eternal is the historical." 107 In this context, Schufreider 
claims that Climacus develops a "distinctive category of faith." 108 According to 
Schufreider, Kierkegaard' s contention that "if a subject believes with infinite and 
unconditional passion, then the object of that belief must be of a sort that it is a suitable 
candidate for such passion" 109 amounts to the claim that only something like the "absolute 
paradox" can be the object of faith (i.e., belief in the sense of unconditional commitment). 
105 See "Selected entries from Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers pertaining to Philosophical Fragments" 
(Pap. VI B 45), inS. Kierkegaard- Philosophical Fragments, p. 222. 
106 See Schufreider's claim 9 above. 
107 S. Kierkegaard - Philosophical Fragments, p. 62. It is worth noting that Kierkegaard uses the term 
'historical' in a twofold manner. In a broader sense, everything that comes into existence is contingent 
and thus historical, but stricto sensu there are certain events (e.g., human history) that occur due to, 
Kierkegaard says, "a possibility of coming into existence within a coming into existence." (p. 76) 
108 G. Schufreider- "Kierkegaard on Belief Without Justification", p. 161. 
109 G. Schufreider- "Kierkegaard on Be1iefWithout Justification", p. 156. 
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In Kierkegaard's words: "the absurd [of the "absolute paradox"] is the object of faith, and 
the only object that can be believed." 110 The will has a crucial role to play here, since it is 
hard to believe that the eternal has become temporal. For Christians, according to 
Kierkegaard, it is foundational and essential to believe in the significance of this paradox. 
Despite the lack of evidence for such a belief, the Christian believer is obliged 
volitionally to control it. The only way to believe it is by means of voluntarily choosing to 
do so. This is the central feature in Kierkegaard's account of the relation between will and 
belief. 
Evans contends that "Climacus' point is not the indefensible claim that 
beliefs are always simply willed into being, regardless of the evidential situation of the 
believer, [but] rather the subtler claim that there is a logical gap between whatever totally 
objective, certain evidence we have for matters of fact, and our beliefs about these 
matters." 111 Thus what Kierkegaard maintains about the importance of subjective factors 
in the formation of our beliefs is that, according to Evans, "our beliefs always contain an 
element of risk, because the objective evidential situation always contains an element of 
uncertainty, uncertainty which we resolve in the formation of our beliefs." 112 Thus faith 
requires "the leap." In a very persuasive way, Evans contends: "What is required in the 
leap of faith is not an immoral attempt to manipulate my beliefs so as to make myself 
believe what I know is untrue. Rather, I am asked to transform myself so that I can be 
110 S. Kierkegaard- Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 189. 
111 C. S. Evans- "Does Kierkegaard think beliefs can be directly willed?", p. 180. 
112 C. S. Evans- "Does Kierkegaard think beliefs can be directly willed?", p. 181. 
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open to an encounter with the truth which will totally transform my life." 113 
Schufreider holds that, according to Kierkegaard, "faith cannot embrace the 
absurd because it takes it to be objectively true; it cannot hold to its matter for any reason, 
since faith cannot know, but is called upon blindly to believe." 114 In accordance with 
Schufreider's claim, we can not only differentiate between an "epistemic" and a 
"foundational" aspect of belief, but we can even argue that there is, actually, no sense in 
which we can talk about an epistemic aspect of belief in Kierkegaard. Belief occurs only 
where it is impossible to arrive at knowledge, due to what Kierkegaard terms "objective 
uncertainty." Let us examine in more detail Kierkegaard's position on the relation 
between belief and knowledge. 
Belief, Faith, and Knowledge 
It has been already shown that, according to Kierkegaard, faith is not to be 
defined in epistemic terms. Kierkegaard states that "faith is not a knowledge, for all 
knowledge is either knowledge of the eternal, which excludes the temporal and the 
historical as inconsequential, or it is purely historical knowledge." 115 Kierkegaard says 
that the historical is characterized by the "illusiveness [Svigagtighed] of coming into 
113 C. S. Evans- "Does Kierkegaard think beliefs can be directly willed?", p. 183. 
114 G. Schufreider- "Kierkegaard on Belief Without Justification", p. 163. 
115 S. Kierkegaard- Philosophical Fragments, p. 62. 
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existence, [which] cannot be sensed immediately." 116 For him, no coming into existence 
is necessary; therefore, the historical is contingent. Furthermore, Kierkegaard submits, 
"All coming into existence occurs in freedom, not by way of necessity." 117 
Pojman does not accept the validity and coherence of Kierkegaard's 
argument about the nature of belief118, nor the way in which Schufreider unpacks it, and 
tries to prove its inconsistency by means of drawing out several passages from 
Kierkegaard's Papers. Challenging Schufreider's position, Pojman argues that "it seems 
that Kierkegaard and his pseudonym both allow that subjectivity can result in objective 
truth, in spite of what Climacus says in some more extravagant passages." 119 Thus, for 
Pojman, Kierkegaard's argument suggests that "subjectivity results in objective 
knowledge or at least approaches it." 120 More problematic though, for Pojman, is the issue 
of the paradox. In the quest for the knowledge of the absurd, Pojman says, Kierkegaard 
allows subjectivity to result in objective truth. I hope that it has become already clear 
during my analysis that this is not so, although more relevant arguments are still to come. 
Schufreider correctly insists that for Kierkegaard faith is not a form of 
knowledge. It follows that truth, as regards the object of faith, can be known neither 
objectively nor subjectively. If we accept the mediation of objectivity in relation to the 
matter of faith, then faith ceases to be faith and turns itself into mere ordinary belief. 
Schufreider points out that a clear-cut distinction between faith and knowledge is 
116 S. Kierkegaard- Philosophical Fragments, p. 81. 
117 S. Kierkegaard- Philosophical Fragments, p. 75. 
118 Pojman says: "I don't think Kierkegaard's arguments are coherent." L. P. Pojman - "Kierkegaard, 
Subjectivity and Paradox: A Response to Gregory Schufreider", in International Journal for Philosophy 
of Religion, vol. 12, no. 3, Martin us Nijhoff Publishers, 1981, p. 165. 
119 L. P. Pojman -"Kierkegaard, Subjectivity and Paradox", p. 166. 
120 L. P. Pojman -"Kierkegaard, Subjectivity and Paradox", p. 167. 
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necessary, since they lead to different ends and since each of them serve "an 
indispensable role in the sphere in which it belongs, neither capable of substituting for the 
other.'d 21 Under these circumstances, there is no sense in which knowledge can be 
described as "justified true belief," at least not in the sense Kierkegaard discusses belief. 
Not only is the distinction between faith and knowledge necessary, but my claim is that it 
is essential to regard it as an exclusive disjunction of the type Kierkegaard often employs, 
i.e., "either-or." We either have knowledge, or we have faith, for where there is doubt and 
objective uncertainty, subjectivity takes the lead and grounds our beliefs. Let us develop 
this view on the relation between doubt and faith. 
The influence that skeptical arguments have on the acceptance of religious 
belief is strong. Richard H. Popkin maintains that Kierkegaard may have seen this 
"intimate and basic relation" and may have realized that "skepticism [is] not necessarily 
the enemy of religion, but could be, rather, its truest friend and ally." 122 
Kierkegaard puts 'belief' (Tro) in opposition to 'doubt' (Tvivl). Doubt is 
then "reduced to nothing" (tilintetgjort) by a resolution. But the resolution to believe does 
not overcome the theoretical grounds for skeptical doubt. As Popkin puts it, the resolution 
to believe "only enables one to affirm on the practicallevel." 123 The skeptical problem is 
still open and objective uncertainty still there, but what resolution does is to cut the 
Gordian knot of skepticism. Belief is thus a substitute 124 for doubt. 
121 G. Schufreider- "Kierkegaard on Belief Without Justification", p. 163. 
122 Richard H. Popkin - "Kierkegaard and Scepticism", in S¢ren Kierkegaard. Critical Assessments of 
Leading Philosophers (vol. II), p. 237. 
123 R. H. Popkin- "Kierkegaard and Scepticism", p. 250. 
124 See above, in Chapter Two, Price's contention that belief is a substitute for knowledge. (p. 30) 
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Kierkegaard clearly opposes belief to doubt: "belief is the opposite of 
doubt." 125 Belief and doubt can occur when we have indiscernible or totally inconclusive 
evidence for the truth of a certain proposition, as in the case of belief in the existence of a 
Deus absconditus. Yet if we only ground belief on direct empirical evidence but are 
confronted, as in the case of the divine existence, with the lack of such evidence, we can 
easily hold that the belief in God's existence is doubtful and groundless. On this basis, J. 
L. Schellenberg has formulated an argument for the "reasonableness of non-belief." In 
considering that argument it is important to remember that some of us still hold the belief 
in the existence of God (even a hidden one). The question then is: "What makes the belief 
in the existence of this hidden God possible?" "What is the sort of justification one finds 
for holding such a belief?" 
Schellenberg is primarily concerned with the issue of the possibility of a 
personal relation to God. From Schellenberg's perspective, this relationship is 
problematic if that God is a hidden God. Since we do not have enough evidence to ground 
our belief in the existence of such a hidden God, we consequently cannot appropriately 
relate to him. If that is the case, then the impossibility of a relationship contradicts God's 
agape, which requires, according to Schellenberg, a personal relation with every human 
being, as a conditio sine qua non of God's perfect nature. Hence, God is not perfectly 
loving, and therefore God does not exist. Thus Schellenberg claims that "we can argue 
from the reasonableness of nonbelief to the nonexistence of God." 126 According to 
Schellenberg, the proposition "God seeks to be personally related to us" is essential to 
125 S. Kierkegaard- Philosophical Fragments, p. 84. 
126 J. L. Schellenberg- Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, p. 3. 
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any adequate explication of the proposition "God loves human beings." On that basis, 
Schellenberg maintains that "God, if loving, seeks explicit, reciprocal relationship with us 
[my emphasis]." 127 This is one of the central claims in Schellenberg's argument. 
Schellenberg's argument against the existence of a "hidden God" is 
irrelevant, for it in fact restricts the justification attempt only to the use of empirical 
evidence. It is appropriate and indeed reasonable to hold that it is difficult to come to a 
legitimate conclusion regarding the existence of God, due to our lack of strong evidence 
that he exists. But, if not direct evidence, what else then determines that belief? 
Kierkegaard's answer to the even more complicated issue of the paradoxical faith in the 
existence of Christ is: "grace and will." God offers "the condition of faith," i.e., the 
possibility to believe in the revealed existential paradox of Christ, in spite of the 
"objective uncertainty" that characterizes it. The will then "resolves to believe" 128 what 
has initially occurred as a gift of grace. Faith is a gift (Gave); if we are offered this gift 
and accept it, then it is our task ( Opgave) to believe. 
Before addressing the issue of "the condition of faith," let us draw a 
preliminary conclusion from the previous analysis and notice how it has become clear 
that, in order to be able to formulate an accurate interpretation of Kierkegaard's 
volitionalism, one needs to focus more closely on his perspective on the nature of faith. 
Hitherto, I tried to show that, according to Kierkegaard, there is no sense in which we can 
truly believe something that we already know to be indubitably true. "Objective 
127 J. L. Schellenberg- Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, p. 18. 
128 S. Kierkegaard- Philosophical Fragments, note 53, p. 83. 
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uncertainty" demands subjective involvement, that is, in the case of faith, choosing to 
believe in the paradoxical nature of the Christian God. But how is that possible? The main 
question becomes: "What is the necessary condition for believing the paradox?" This is 
the most important issue in determining the nature of faith and the role of the will in 
relation to it. 
The Condition of Faith 
Kierkegaard writes that "faith is not an act of will, for it is always the case 
that all human willing is efficacious only within the condition [Betingelse], [ ... ] but if I 
do not posses the condition[ ... ] then all my willing is of no avail." 129 This crucial passage 
in the Philosophical Fragments has received various interpretations. Evans maintains that 
"faith is [ ... ] explicitly identified as 'the condition' for understanding the truth, the 
condition that Climacus has [ ... ] assumed that human beings lack and must receive from 
the god." 130 
The question then is: "How does one acquire faith and arrive at the condition 
m which reason can understand the reasonableness of recognizing its limits?" 
Kierkegaard's answer is that "God must grant the condition." 131 Evans argues that "this 
transformation is not an act of will on the part of the believer, even though [ ... ] an act of 
129 S. Kierkegaard- Philosophical Fragments, p. 62 ff. 
13° C. Stephen Evans- "Reason and the paradox", in S¢ren Kierkegaard. Critical Assessments of Leading 
Philosophers (vol. II), p. 93. 
131 Cf. S. Kierkegaard- Philosophical Fragments, pp. 55-56 (222). 
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will (or perhaps repeated acts of will) is necessary for it to occur, because it is not an act 
which the agent can simply carry out on his or her own, [since] the ability to believe 
requires something which the believer can only receive directly from the god." 132 
On this basis, David Wisdo argues that faith is a miracle and not a species of 
belief. Therefore, the will plays no role in the determination of faith. The believer is the 
passive agent who enjoys the miracle of faith. Wisdo attempts to demonstrate that 
Kierkegaard solely understands faith in terms of a miracle 133 , i.e., the gift of the 
privileged "condition" for understanding the truth about God, and therefore he contends 
that "any epistemological reduction of faith distorts its true character." 134 In other words, 
faith cannot be analyzed, according to Wisdo, as a special case of belief135 • 
As a consequence, Wisdo contends that Pojman's philosophical account is 
fundamentally misguided, for it suggests that Kierkegaard allows that the acquisition of 
faith be explained by appealing to the will. However, as I have previously shown, 
Kierkegaard's view of faith involves the will and subjective involvement. I would only 
add, together with Pojman, that in Kierkegaard faith not only involves the will, but "a 
form of direct (or indirect version which is nearly direct) volitionalism is regnant in the 
process." 136 
My claim is that Kierkegaard's view can be described as a direct 
volitionalism but not in the traditional sense of the term, where it is held that "the will is 
132 C. Stephen Evans- "Reason and the paradox", p. I 04. 
133 S. Kierkegaard, p. 65: "Faith itself is a wonder." 
134 D. Wisdo- "Kierkegaard on Belief, Faith, and Explanation", p. 96. 
135 Cf. D. Wisdo- "Kierkegaard on Belief, Faith, and Explanation", p. 108. 
136 L.P. Pojman- "Kierkegaard on Faith and Freedom", p. 58. 
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responsible for the formation or the acquisition of beliefs." On the contrary, Kierkegaard 
holds that the will has a direct role only in the actualization of beliefs. In my Introduction, 
where I have offered the definition of volitionalism, I have purposely designated it as "the 
theory that confers a determinative role on the will in relation to belief," 137 without 
mentioning the specific way in which the will determines our beliefs. Thus Kierkegaard's 
volitionalism is direct, in the sense stipulated above. The indirectness of Kierkegaard's 
volitionalism is denoted by the fact that, although beliefs are not voluntarily acquired or 
directly willed into being, they are indirectly influenced by the will. Their possibility is 
actualized through volitional choice. 
According to M. Jamie Ferreira, it is Wisdo's contention that "there is no 
describable human activity at work in the acquisition of faith." 138 On the one hand, over 
against Wisdo's interpretation of Kierkegaard's views on this matter, Ferreira maintains 
that "one cannot use the claim that faith is a wonder to refute the claim that it is a choice." 
Equally, Ferreira also rejects Pojman's interpretation, on the grounds that Kierkegaard's 
perspective is not a volitionalist account of the acquisition of faith, [but rather] a 
volitionalist account of the response to the gift of faith." 139 Belief is an occurrence that 
has to germinate in the soil of our convictions and existential commitments. Like in a 
seed, belief is there only as a possibility that needs to be cultivated and thus actualized. 
The volitional control of a certain belief is our response to its occurrence. If and only if 
we voluntarily choose to cultivate that particular belief, it then ceases to be only possible 
137 See p. I above. 
138 M. Jamie Ferreira - "Kierkegaardian faith: 'the condition' and the response", in International Journal 
for Philosophy of Religion, vol. 28, no. 2, October, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990, p. 66. 
139 M. J. Ferreira- "Kierkegaardian faith: 'the condition' and the response", p. 68. 
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and it becomes actual, as a part of our existential commitments. 
In this context, Ferreira suggests a view in which "faith is neither passive 
and ineffable nor the direct result of a deliberate decision," 140 relying on the distinction 
between passive acquisition and response to the gift of faith, as shown above. Using the 
visual metaphor, Ferreira argues that the gift of the necessary condition for faith opens the 
agent's eyes. Yet the agent's free activity is still needed. In other words, "faith involves 
an agent's actualization (enabled by God) of a bestowed capacity." 141 In this context, 
Kierkegaard's use of the modal categories of possibility and actuality has a crucial import 
on the understanding of the nature of faith. 
There has been a good deal of debate about Kierkegaard's understanding of 
modal categories. Much of the controversy stems from the lack of clarity concerning his 
use of the terms "actuality" and "possibility." Kierkegaard writes that a "being [Vteren] 
that nevertheless is a non-being [Ikke- Vteren], is possibility [MulighedJ, and a being that 
is being is indeed actual being or actuality, and the change of coming into existence 
[Tilblivelses Forandring] is the transition from possibility to actuality." 142 Thus, 
Kierkegaard dialectically defines coming into existence as a transition from possibility to 
actuality. The same thing happens with faith which requires individual's agency, in order 
to actualize and make use of its condition. 
Ferreira's most important suggestion 1s that the "condition" can be 
understood in a twofold manner: "either in terms of the conferral of a potentiality to be 
140 M. J. Ferreira- "Kierkegaardian faith: 'the condition' and the response", p. 64. 
141 M. J. Ferreira- "Kierkegaardian faith: 'the condition' and the response", p. 74. 
142 S. Kierkegaard- Philosophical Fragments, p. 74. 
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actualized, a capacity to be exercised, or in terms of the conferral of the actualized ability 
or capacity."143 If we apply Kierkegaard's understanding of modal categories to this issue, 
then we can surely gain some support for the first view. On what she calls 'model A', 
Ferreira admits that the potentiality of faith "still needs to be actualized or exercised by 
the agent, [and thus] the realized possession of the truth would be the exercise of the gift 
of the capacity, the actualizing of the potential which requires some activity on the part of 
the agent." 144 
The gift of the "condition" is indeed a sine qua non for faith, but it is not 
sufficient. It only offers the disposition, the possibility to choose to make the leap of faith. 
As Ferreira remarks, model A "allows the possibility of giving some content to the notion 
of free, responsible activity in the acquisition of faith (suggested by 'leap' or 'decision'), 
for it implies that one still has to do something by way of response to the condition." 145 
My contention is that this is a central claim in Kierkegaard's argument and that it 
illuminates both acquisition and cultivation of faith. Faith is a 'gift' (Gave) that has to be 
taken up as a 'task' (Opgave), as a necessary existential commitment; it is a possibility 
that has to be chosen, cultivated, and thus actualized. This is the sort of direct 
prescriptivism Kierkegaard holds, based on the idea that the appropriation of beliefs 
through choice is the only way in which they can actually determine the content of one's 
personality. The prescriptive character resides in the relation between 'gift' and 'task' that 
Kierkegaard illuminates, which seems to be easier to grasp in Danish. The possibility of 
143 M. J. Ferreira- "Kierkegaardian faith: 'the condition' and the response", pp. 69-70. 
144 M. J. Ferreira- "Kierkegaardian faith: 'the condition' and the response", p. 70. 
145 M. J. Ferreira- "Kierkegaardian faith: 'the condition' and the response", p. 71. 
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faith is laid down at our feet, but it is our responsibility to pick it up, to actualize it, and to 
walk with it. 
Beliefs and Existential Commitments 
For Kierkegaard, the individual's actuality is "not the external action but an 
interiority in which the individual annuls possibility and identifies himself with what is 
thought in order to [believe and] exist in it." 146 Let us examine the following assertion 
that could be developed from such a view: "You are what you actually believe." This can 
be developed into: (1) "You are what you actually believe you are, i.e., what you actually 
believe yourself to be" and (2) "You are what your actual beliefs are." 
Now, I will overlook the former formula, as being too broad an existentialist 
claim, different from Kierkegaard's contention. As regards the latter, I take that to mean 
the following: "You are your commitments, your existential projects, your actualized 
possibilities of individual becoming." It can be said in this context that the psychology of 
belief embraces the view that the deepest beliefs are foundational and responsible for the 
development of one's personality. This is so regardless of whether those beliefs are 
involuntarily and unconsciously inherited from so-called "social conditioning," or are 
voluntarily chosen and cultivated. In both cases, our beliefs shape the way we see the 
world in which we live, i.e., they directly determine our individuality and our view of life 
146 S. Kierkegaard- Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 
339. 
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(Livsanskuelse ). 
It would be indeed very difficult to admit that we have only one definite 
answer when faced with the existential issue of deciding whether one way of living our 
life is better than another. Therefore the objective uncertainty, in this case the 
impossibility of reaching the objective truth about the most appropriate existential 
standpoint, urges us to admit "the need to live out some option [and] makes the risk of 
choosing necessary." 147 Besides, since embracing different existential standpoints is not a 
very practical solution in one's limited lifetime, it seems that the "concern for the shape 
of one's life, and the concomitant risk of committing oneself to the actualization of a 
possibility" 148 becomes utterly indispensable. 
Existence can be described as a "movement" of the individual towards the 
actualization of "unique possibilities by means of qualitative transitions from possibility 
to actuality," 149 and one's existential beliefs are analogously arrived at, as well. The will 
has an important function during this process. As I argued in Chapter Two, it does at least 
allow us to choose what to do when evidence is scarce, irrelevant, or totally inexistent. 
The gift of our condition is that we can believe something when evidence is not available. 
This is in fact one of the most progressive features in our lives. It enables us freely to 
choose the basis for our actions when objective uncertainty would solely suspend them 
sine die. 
147 Lee C. Barrett- "Subjectivity is (un)truth. Climacus 's dialectically sharpened pathos", p. 26. 
148 Lee C. Barrett- "Subjectivity is (un)truth. Climacus 's dialectically sharpened pathos", p. 27. 
149 G. J. Stack- Kierkegaard' s Existential Ethics, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1977, p. 50. 
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Conclusion 
I have tried to show that one of the major claims in Kierkegaard's argument 
is that there is no sense in which we can talk about an epistemic aspect of belief in the 
"eminent sense," as faith. Belief occurs only when it is impossible to arrive at knowledge. 
Thus belief occurs under the pressure of what Kierkegaard terms as "objective 
uncertainty." As faith, it originates in the divine grace. 
The problem regarding the role of the will in relation to our beliefs has been 
elucidated in the light of a brief reconsideration of Kierkegaard' s interpretation of modal 
categories, in particular actuality and possibility. I have shown that Kierkegaard's 
volitionalism is generally misinterpreted, since what he contends with regard to the role 
of will in relation to belief is that a belief is an occurrence, prior to and requiring the 
agent's direct and voluntarily choosing to believe. Thus the will determines the transition 
of a belief from possibility to actuality, through choice. In the light of Kierkegaard's 
metaphysics, my final comments have focused on the relation between our beliefs and our 
existential commitments. 
Let us now go over the whole course of reasoning, in order to draw the 
various points of my argument together. For that, it will be necessary to use again the 
language I have introduced in the first two chapters. 
In Chapter One, I pointed out that belief could be circumscribed, in the first 
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instance, within the limits of the traditional definition of knowledge. I introduced some 
basic conceptual distinctions regarding the nature of belief (epistemic vs. foundational 
belief, propositional belief vs. evaluative belief, "belief that" vs. "belief in" or "faith," 
belief as occurrence vs. belief as disposition). I submitted that belief has a determinative 
role for actions, and, in this context, I claimed that the problem of belief justification is 
much more difficult to assess in the context of inconclusive evidential support, when 
skepticism calls for the suspension of belief. 
In Chapter Two, I argued that, particularly in the case of the absence of 
evidence, the application of the will has a determinative role for beliefs (the view of 
volitionalism). I claimed that belief is an occurrence that has to be entertained and offered 
assent. I also argued that there is a certain prescriptive character of volitionalism that 
offers the framework for a minimal ethics of belief. I aimed at accurately unpacking the 
bundle of arguments in the dispute over volitionalism. I have closely investigated the 
debate over some of the most significant issues in volitionalism, such as the distinctions 
between direct vs. indirect volitionalism, descriptive vs. prescriptive volitionalism. In this 
context, I tried to integrate Kierkegaard's account of volitionalism into the contemporary 
debate. 
In Chapter Three, I indicated that the contemporary debate over the nature of 
Kierkegaard's volitionalism has a major importance in the effort to assign the proper 
place to the will, but I argue that the dispute has been partially misguided due to the 
attempt to identify the role of the will in relation to the acquisition of belief. For 
Kierkegaard, belief as faith is not voluntarily acquired but only actualized. I also tried to 
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show that, for Kierkegaard, there is an exclusive disjunction between belief and 
knowledge, for belief occurs only when it is impossible to arrive at knowledge. Thus 
belief is an occurrence accompanied by "objective uncertainty." 
I conclude that Kierkegaard's volitionalism is a direct volitionalism, defined 
according to the distinction between cause and condition of belief. With that important 
restriction that belief is not caused by the will but only influenced by it, Kierkegaard's 
volitionalism holds that belief in "the most eminent sense" of faith is a gift of grace that 
needs to be willingly believed. This indicates the prescriptive character of Kierkegaard's 
volitionalism: the appropriation of beliefs through choice is the only way in which they 
can actually determine the content of one's personality. As such, belief is a possibility 
that needs to be actualized by means of voluntarily choosing to believe it and, more 
importantly, to believe in it. The will has no role in the formation of beliefs, it does not 
cause either "belief-that" nor "belief-in," but it determines the deliberate choice of 
believing either of them. 
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